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Preface
The Plaintiff, Mr. Andrew Barrett Mefford-Stanger, Pro-se, while under duress, due to the
Idaho Supreme Court's unlawful and unconstitutional order of February 6th 2014(Ref. No. 1465), as well as in formal protest against such actions as they have been taken by the Idaho
Supreme Court 1. That has thereby also rendered the Idaho Supreme Court's as well as the Idaho

1

See generally, Plaintiff/Appellant's Objection, Motion, And Memorandum for Reconsideration
In Opposition To the Idaho Supreme Court's Order of February 6th, 2014, which is on file with
this Court. Also see generally that of Federalist No. 78, attributed to Alexander Hamilton,
making the same argument overall, as well as specifically his line of: "There is no position which
depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of
the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the
Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his
principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior
to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their
powers do not authorize, but what they forbid."). Moreover, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 2 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1803), at 176-179, in which Chief Justice John Marshall stated
simply. That, those" ... who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in
court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their
eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation
of all written constitutions." Furthermore, see also Federalist No. 44, attributed to James
Madison, who noted that state legislatures were invested with all powers not specifically defined
in the constitution, but also said that having the federal government subservient to various state
constitutions would be an inversion of the principles of government. Concluding that if
supremacy were not established "it would have seen the authority of the whole society
everywhere subordinate to the authority of .")----(Continued on next page in Footnotes)-----------
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Court of Appeals authority and any orders produced therefrom, automatically null and void, as
such orders have been made and executed without the authority of law to do so, and are in
violation of law and a criminal action. Hereby submits, involuntarily, the following Plaintiffs
Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief In Support Of Petition For Review Pursuant To I.A.R. 118 and I.A.R.
42, only to deal with the subject matter contained therein. Moreover, such action is not an
implied or direct release of claim for any criminal actions, but rather, an action to only to deal
with the subject matter contained therein the instant action, as well as preserve the Plaintiff's
rights and the record, for further legal, investigative, and other forms of recourse for such
criminal and other actions as are appropriate under law. Correspondingly, the Plaintiff also
reminds both this Court, the Idaho Supreme Court that with all due respect, given that the
Plaintiff is a Pro-se pleader, and therefore, the United States Supreme Courts' holding in Haines

----------(Continued from prior page footnote 1) -("the parts; it would have seen a monster, in
which the head was under the direction of the members." See also Federalist No. 33, attributed to
Alexander Hamilton, whom stated: "If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that
society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter
into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
entrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the
individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the
good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL
POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the large
society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the
residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These
will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that
the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just
before considered, only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the
institution of a federal government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it
expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution; which I mention
merely as an instance of caution in the convention; since that limitation would have been to be
understood, though it had not been expressed.")
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v. Kerner. That Pro-se pleadings are to be held to less stringent standards than those drafted by
attorneys, by this or any other court, hereby also applies.
Additionally, the Plaintiff, with all due respect to this Court and the Idaho Appeals Court,
and their members, would remind this Court and the Idaho Appeals Court that it would do well
to consider, and avoid, any acts that might be considered retaliatory under the Americans with
Disability Act (ADA). The Plaintiff/Appellant has filled, on October 22nd, 2013, a Title II ADA
complaint denoting such violations as well as other color of law violations of the lower court and
Judge, with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further
investigation. Furthermore, if any such actions are taken by this, or any other Court, or its
personnel it will be denoted and filed with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for further investigations, in addition to the original Title II ADA complaint filed
on October 22nd, 2013.
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Introduction
The Plaintiff Hereby submits, involuntarily, the following Plaintiffs Brief in Support of the
Plaintiffs Petition for Review Pursuant To I.AR. 118 And I.AR. 42, only to deal with the
subject matter contained therein as noted above in the preface, and respectfully seeks judicial
review of the July 17th, 2014 decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals below, in part.

Standard of Review and Facts of the Case
The Plaintiff hereby references where necessary, the standard of review from the Plaintiffs
Initial Brief, Redone Initial Brief, and Reply Brief in the instant action. Further, in State v.
Oliver, 170 P.3d 387, 144 Idaho 722 (2007) at 389 , this Court stated that the Standard of Review
applicable to a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision was that ''this Court gives
serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of
the lower court. Head v. State, 137 Idaho 1, 43 P.3d 760 (2002)." Additionally, The Plaintiff
hereby references where necessary, the facts from the Plaintiffs Initial Brief, Redone Initial
Brief, and Reply Brief in the instant action, as well as those stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals
Decision of July 17th, 2014, to hereby be the facts of the case. Additionally, the Plaintiff hereby
as well as in the Petition disputes the factual issue that the Idaho case law does not support a
cause of action for child support past the age of majority. For simply, Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho
253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984) was only partially overturned by LC. § 5-334(1 ), as to wrongful life,
not the wrongful birth claim. Furthermore, LC.§ 73-116, allows for the common law, and in
common law, there is such a recognized duty and requirement stretching back many centuries.
Moreover, the common sense fact, that just because there is not case law in the state of Idaho for
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something, does not mean it does not exist, and in fact, such cases are otherwise known as
precedential, as such an exact issue has never been heard before in these Courts or in this State,
they tend to set precedent and law. However, they require the Courts to rely on other authorities
outside the State in law, or other types of authorities to come up with an answer to the case. All
other Factual Allegations in the Plaintiffs Petition for Review are also hereby made to this Court
to decide upon in the Plaintiffs Petition for Review, as well.

Argument
I. The Idaho Appeals Court erred as to law regarding the standard
of review imposed upon this case, which is in direct contravention
to this Court's holdings as well as U.S. Supreme Court binding
precedent?
The Idaho Appeals Court errored, specifically, on Page 2, Ln. 24-27 of the Idaho Court of
Appeals Decision of July 17th 2014. The Idaho Court of Appeals cited Dunnick v. Elder, 126
Idaho 308,311,882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994) at 482 n.l that in tum cites the view from
Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L.J. 745,
750 (1974), that: "Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing
with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's
evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking." This law review article was written well before that of the United States Supreme Court's
holding Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) and Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), and reflected the
old way of doing things in Summary Judgment Procedure. However, Celotex v. Catrett and
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. completely changed and revised Summary Judgment Procedure
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in all federal and state courts across this nation for the rest of time thereafter, by requiring the
moving party to go beyond simple conclusory statements, and back up their arguments with
evidence.
For example, in Justice White's concurring statements therein Celotex v. Catrett, which
concurred with Justice Rehnquist on the majority opinion and therefore made it the plurality
opinion of the case, as well as the controlling vote. Moreover, given the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Marks v. United States, herein after referred to as the Marks rule, of: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' -(Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) at 193) Justice White's concurring statements therein Celotex v. Catret, are also the binding and
controlling holding of the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, Justice White's concurring
statements therein, at 328 ,is hereby stated, to the extent relevant, as the United States Supreme
Court's controlling and overall holding, in Celotex v. Catrett: "I agree that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that the moving defendant
must always support his motion with evidence or affidavits showing the absence of
a genuine dispute about a material fact. I also agree that the movant may rely on
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the like, to demonstrate that the
plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case and hence that there can be no factual
dispute. But the movant must discharge the burden the Rules place upon him:
It is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the
motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no
evidence to prove his case.
A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery or reveal his witnesses or evidence
unless required to do so under the discovery rules or by Court order. Of
course, he must respond if required to do so; but he need not also depose his
witnesses or obtain their affidavits to defeat a summary judgment motion
asserting only that he has failed to produce any support for his case. It is the
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defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the suit." (Emphasis mine)Thus, rendering the view expressed in Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment
Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L.J. 745, 750 (1974), as a view that was no longer valid,
as law had changed. Therefore, the Idaho Appeals Court not only errored by using such law, as

it has decided, as per I.A.R. 118(b)(2), a question of substance that is not in accord with
applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court, let alone that of this Court and its
decisions. Such as, for example2, Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531,887
P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994), at 1037-1039, in which this Court in stated in discussing its holding
therein:
'[I]f a party moving for summary judgment raises issues in his motion but then
fails to provide any evidence showing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact
with respect to those issues, the nonmoving party has no burden to respond with
supporting evidence." Which was, according to this Court, also consistent with Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690,
838 P.2d 293 (1992) at 301, where this Court stated in its explanation for its holding: "Concerning the element of actual damages, with which Pike also joins the
element of proximate cause, Pike did not support her motion with any evidence
showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact that Pike's alleged
conduct was the proximate cause of any actual damages to Thompson. In the
absence of evidence supporting the motion as to these elements, Thompson
had no burden to respond with evidence supporting actual damages
proximately caused by Pike's conduct." - (holding mine) -

2

See also Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994);Thomson v. Idaho
Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530,887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994); G & M Farms v. Funk
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 (1991); Christiansen v. Rumsey, 91 Idaho 684,429
P.2d 416 (1967).See also Justice Brennan's dissent therein Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 l 7, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(Justice Brennan, Dissent) at 329 -337.
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As well as Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 918 P.2d 583 (1996),
at 588, in which this Court, in explaining the standard of review for Summary Judgment, stated: "The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125
Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). In order to meet its burden, the moving
party must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence the absence
of any genuine issue of material fact on an element of the nonmoving party's
case. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034,
1038 (1994).If the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to
present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
on that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the
non-moving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence." (balding mine) As well as Shelton v. Shelton, 225 P.3d 693, 148 Idaho 560 (2009) at 698 - 699, in which
this Court again stated: "On a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he burden of proving the absence of
material facts is upon the moving party. Once the moving party establishes the
absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a
genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist."
Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003). "[I]f a party moving for
summary judgment raises issues in his motion but then fails to provide any
evidence showing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to those
issues, the nonmoving party has no burden to respond with supporting evidence."
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531,887 P.2d 1034, 1038
(1994)." Therefore, as the Idaho Appeals Court not only errored by using such law and decided a
question of substance that is not in accord with applicable decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, but that of this Court and its decisions as well, as per I.A.R. l l 8(b )(2). Thus, the
Plaintiff respectfully prays that review be granted, and the decision of the Idaho Appeals Court
reversed, in part, as to specifically these grounds, leaving the stipulated points on the Plaintiffs
petition for review alone.
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II. The Idaho Appeals Court not only erred as to Idaho statutory
law, as it relates to Child Support, but also erred in its
interpretation of it, which is inconsistent with it and its correct
usage?
1) Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, I.C. § 7-1001-1062
The Idaho Appeals Court in dealing with the issue of Past-Due Child Support, stated that
I.C. § 7-1009 provides continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over child support matters to the
magistrate division, however, this is in error in two ways.

A. One
LC.§ 7-1009 and its language of "A tribunal of this state ..." must be read in tandem with
that of I.C. § 7-1003, that declares that "[t]he district courts are the tribunals of this state," not the
Magistrates Division of the District Courts.

B. Two
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, I.C. § 7-1001 - 1062, hereinafter (UIFSA),does
not apply in this situation3 • Instead I.C. § 32-706, which is Idaho's residential child support
statue, controls when both parties are located in the same state, whereas the UIFSA is an
"Interstate" law and only controls when one of the parties is located outside of the State of Idaho,

3 The

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, I.C. § 7-1001 -1062, did not apply upon the
filling of this instant action nor at any time therefore prior to such filling, as all persons and
parties thereto resided within that of the States of Idaho, rendering I.C. § 32-706 controlling.
Until such time as during the appeal in June 1st 2013 to the current, during which the Plaintiff
had, with the help of family members members, therefore rendering The Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act, I.C. § 7-1001- 1062 now controlling.
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and not intra-county. In fact, the Plaintiff would argue that the Idaho Appeals Court also errored
in State, Child Support Servs. v. Smith, 136 Idaho 775, 778, 40 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2001) at
136-137, which the Idaho Appeals Court used UIFSA to back up their premise in the instant
action, that the magistrate division of the district court has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction
over the child support orders it issues.
As in State, Child Support Servs. v. Smith at 136 -137, the Idaho Appeals Court cited I.C. §
7-1008, which is part of UIFSA, as concerning the Magistrates Division of the District Court's
jurisdiction to issue child support orders. However, this is again, a misapplication of the UIFSA
that has run rampantly throughout this court system, as one, in State, Child Support Servs. v.
Smith no party was ever outside the State of Idaho, therefore a law, which although it lends itself
nicely given its format to resolving intra-county child support squabbles, did not apply, instead,
I.C. § 32-706 did, and was the correct statue to apply to the situation in State, Child Support
Servs. v. Smith. For as Federalist No. 33, attributed to Alexander Hamilton, states: -

"If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the
supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a
larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
entrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies,
and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere
treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is
only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not
follow from this doctrine that acts of the large society which are not pursuant to its
constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the
smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely
acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such." Thus, as a simple matter of common sense, given that I.C. § 32-706 is the law of the "State"
of Idaho, not that of one county against another, it stands to reason, that it must be supreme over
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the individuals located within that of the State of Idaho's territorial boundaries. Moreover, that
when one of those individuals relocates to another geographic State within the United States of
America, which would therefore reasonably preclude that of the State of Idaho's Jurisdiction
over the matter as said individual would be located within another State's territorial boundaries.
The UIFSA acts as unified framework and a long arm statue of the State of Idaho, as well as in
other States in the United States of America that have adopted the same, to reach across those
territorial boundaries to enforce or modify Child Support Orders as needed. For simply, the
UIFSA is a law for "interstate," not, "intrastate," use.
Furthermore and arguing in the alternative, even if the UIFSA were to be used "intrastate,"
which its not designed nor intended for, the Plaintiff raises the following question, why has not
LC. § 32-706 been rescinded by the Idaho Legislature as of yet, if, as the Court of Appeals
believes in State, Child Support Servs. v. Smith at 136-137, that UIFSA has replaced I.C. § 32706? The answer is dead simple, UIFSA has not replaced LC.§ 32-706 for when two persons
reside within the State ofldaho. Rather, UIFSA, has, in a way extended LC.§ 32-706, and that
of statues like it in other States , so that a child support order maybe modified or enforced by
reaching across state lines in mutual cooperation between the States. When one of those persons
above relocates to another State, within that of the United States of America, and such an order
needs modified or enforced.
Second, the Idaho Appeals Court also errored in State, Child Support Servs. v. Smith, at 136
-137, by not again reading LC.§ 7-1008 in tandem with that of LC.§ 7-1003, which proscribes
"[t]he district courts are the tribunals of this state," not the Magistrates Division of the District
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Courts. Thus, even if UIFSA did fully apply, the Idaho Court of Appeals would still be in error
in this instant action, as the District Courts are the tribunals of this state, not the Magistrates
Di vision of the District Courts.

2) Jurisdiction of the District Court over the Matter
Furthermore, this continued insistence by the Courts and the Defense that the District Court
correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to entertain this claim, is outright wrong. Moreover, it
is a sorrowful display of the inadequacies of the basics of Education in American Government let
alone Civics courses in our schools today, as well as, perhaps, an incentive to increase such
Education in our schools today. Nonetheless, the District Court of Idaho is a Statewide Court of
General Jurisdiction, not county by county or district by district, moreover, the Idaho
Constitution4 clearly defines the jurisdiction of the District Court. Furthermore, the Idaho
Constitution5, also clearly grants to the Legislature of the State of Idaho the right to set the
Jurisdiction of such Courts that are inferior to this Court, the Idaho Supreme Court. In addition,
LC.§ 32-715 clearly places "Exclusive original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings under
this chapter is in the district court," under which a proceeding for child support, LC. § 32-706,
falls
Additionally, this Court in Carr v. Magistrate Court of First Jud. Dist6, in reviewing the
genesis of the Magistrates Division of the District Court, stated something of interest:-

4

Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 20 (''The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at
law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.")
5 Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 2; and Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 13
6 Carr v. Magistrate Court of First Jud. Dist., 108 Idaho 546, 700 P. 2d 949(1985) at 950 -951
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''The genesis of the jurisdiction of attorney magistrates is found in art. V, § 2 of the
Idaho Constitution, which recognizes the Supreme Court and the district Court as
constitutional courts and then grants authority to the legislature to create inferior
courts with such jurisdiction as prescribed by the legislature.
§ 2. Judicial power - Where vested. - The judicial power of the state
shall be vested in a Court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court,
district courts, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as
established by the legislature. The courts shall constitute a unified and
integrated judicial system for administration and supervision by the
Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of such inferior courts shall be as
prescribed by the legislature. Until provided by law, no changes shall be
made in the jurisdiction or in the manner of the selection of judges of
existing inferior courts. (Emphasis added)
Pursuant to this authority the legislature created the magistrate division of the
district Court and specified the cases assignable to the magistrates by LC. §§ 12208 and 1-2210. Cases which are assignable to both attorney and non-attorney
magistrates are set forth in LC.§ 1-2208, while LC.§ 1-2210 allows additional
categories of cases to be assigned to magistrates with the prohibition that certain
cases cannot be assigned to non-attorney magistrates. The net effect of LC.§ 12210 is to allow categories of cases to be assigned to attorney magistrates without
limit."- (Id at 950 -951) It is that last line above that creates all the heartache for this Court, as in stating that the "net
effect of LC.§ 1-2210 is to allow categories of cases to be assigned to attorney magistrates
without limit," this Court has erred in the most egregious way possible. It has assumed that there
were not overall limits, and that the legislature could not impose such limits on the behalf of the
people of the State of Idaho, but the simple answer is, pursuant to Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 2, they
can and have done so, especially in the creation statue for the Magistrates division of the District
Court7• Moreover, the Idaho legislature expected that this Court would respect that, let alone the

7

See LC. § 1-2201 establishing a magistrate court in each county within the State of Idaho, and
therefore, by common sense and the process of logical elimination, the Idaho legislature
restricted the magistrate court's overall function and jurisdiction to the county in which each one
resides. As simply, logically, and by example, one magistrate court in Ada County cannot reach
across a magistrate court in Canyon County to )-(Continued on next page in footnotes)------------
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Idaho legislature's power to set such limits, but instead, this Court has done the exact opposite
and tried to force the State-wide jurisdiction on a Court system that was only created to serve
county by county, not State-wide jurisdiction. For simple common sense holds the question,

--------------(Continued from previous page footnote# 13)-(example enforce or issue its orders,
as that would be interfering with, usurping, and exorcising jurisdiction reserved by State Law to
the Court sitting over Canyon County, not Ada County. I,e. if one court in one county was
allowed to reach across another of the same court in another county within the same state, you
would have deadlocked courts, and to be frank, pissed off Judges, as one court or Judge would
essentially be interfering with the territorial jurisdiction of the other Court or Judge, creating
total anarchy. In legal principles, this is known as the legal doctrine of a sovereign entity, I.E.
sovereign nation, sovereign state, sovereign county, sovereign city or towns, etc ... , in other
words, before the advent of mutual aid agreements between lower sovereigns, such as counties,
or the relying of smaller sovereigns on a bigger sovereign like a state. You would, for
example, be able to commit a local crime in one smaller sovereign county, such as Ada County,
and as long as you could outlast and outrun the law, getting into Canyon County. The sheriff of
Ada County, without the invented legal doctrine of hot pursuit, i.e. a mutual aid agreement of
sorts, would have to brake off the chase and let the Sheriff of Canyon County take over, if it was
a crime in Canyon County. Otherwise, the Sheriff from Ada County was just plain out of luck
and had lost their person. This is only one common example of the effect of the doctrine of the
sovereign entity that we all see every day, and just do not realize it. Moreover, counties are
often what are known as partial-sovereigns, as on the one hand they are not fully sovereign
given that they must give up part of their sovereignty to the bigger sovereign, in this case the
State. Yet, they still also retain part of their sovereignty and independence, and can use that to
make their own local rules, laws, local governments such as county councils, etc ... while still
obeying the bigger sovereign, and enforcing its rules and laws. See generally this Court in Boise
City v. Blaser, 572 P.2d 892, 98 Idaho 789 (1977) at 894,("Generally speaking, to give effect to
a county permit within city limits would be to violate the separate sovereignty provisions of
Idaho Const., art. 12, § 2, and the careful avoidance of any county/city jurisdictional conflict or
overlap which is safeguarded therein. See, Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho
505,210 P.2d 798 (1949).") as well as generally: LC.§ 31-601; I.C. § 31-602; LC.§ 31-879.
Additionally, a fine example of partial-sovereigns, can be seen in the roles of the Federal
Government and the States. That often tum the States into partial-sovereigns by obeying the
bigger sovereign, the Federal Government, and enforcing its rules and laws, as well as making
them sovereigns, while yet, still having sovereignty and independence to do the same, but only
on the state level. See also I.C. § 31-879 clearly denoting that "the judicial district in which the
county is located ... to appoint a resident magistrate judge for that county.", in other words, a
magistrate judge, is appointed per county jurisdiction, not per state wide jurisdiction.
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why would the Idaho legislature create or attempt to create another Court with State-wide
jurisdiction, when they already had one, pursuant to the Idaho Constitution and statues 8, i.e. the
District Court of Idaho? The simple common sense answer is they would not, and hence, in the
creation of the magistrates division, restricted that division's overall jurisdiction to county-bycounty, not State-wide jurisdiction.
. Furthermore, a former Justice of this Court, Justice Bistline, stated in Winn v. Winn 9 , at
1062, an interesting observation:

"That a district Court (district judge) in Idaho has jurisdiction and authority
to try any divorce action filed in district Court is beyond dispute. Magistrates
do have the authority to try divorce actions, where such jurisdiction has been
conferred upon them, but that does not abridge the concurrent jurisdiction of
the district courts." -(holding and underlining mine) This is also in line with the Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 20, that proscribes that " The district court
shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate
jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." Thus, any argument that the district court does not
have jurisdiction over the instant action is outright pointless and moot, as it clearly does.
Also as former Justice of this Court, Justice Bistline, in Winn v. Winn9, but a little farther
down at 1064, made another interesting observation: -

"[ .. .]In obvious recognition that a district Court judge's jurisdiction is equal
to and greater than the jurisdiction of a magistrate, the legislature further
provided that the district Court on reversal "may direct that the case be tried
de novo before him." I.C. § 1-2213."- (Bolding, underlining, and shorting mine)

8 Idaho Const. Art. Five§ 2; Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 10; Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 20, supra 4; J.C.§ 1701; J.C.§ 1-705
9 Winn v. Winn, 101 Idaho 270, 272, 611 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980) (Justice Bistline, Dissent)
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Thus, ultimately, while such jurisdiction may be conferred upon Magistrates by court rule,
that rule must in tum elevate such Magistrate to the level of a District Court Judge, to in turn,
comply with LC.§ 32-715 and the like, which is exactly what LR.C.P. Rule 82(c)(2)'s opening
paragraph does. However, it still does not abridge or remove the jurisdiction of the District
Courts to decide the issue, if presented to that of the District Court for that of its decision, for the
Attorney Magistrate and a District Court Judge both share concurrent jurisdiction to hear the
matter. However, that in no way means that if an Attorney Magistrate renders a decision
originally under LR.C.P. Rule 82(c)(2)'s provision, in a case as the initial Court. See generally
the former Justice of this Court, Justice Bistline, in Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611, 116
Idaho 297 (1989) (Justice Bistline, Dissent), at 626, alluding to some of the history on LC. § 32715 and the District Court's Jurisdiction:
" ... The custody controversy has been thoroughly litigated by the parties in the
forum which the legislature created for the resolution of such disputes, namely the
state judicial system. Even before statehood the territorial legislature vested the
district courts with [']Exclusive original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings
to ... make all necessary orders for the custody of children.['] Rev. Stat. 1887, §
2483. Specifically the legislature provided that in divorce actions the district court
would [']give such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of
the marriage as may seem necessary or proper, and may at any time vacate or
modify the same.['] Rev. Stat. §2473. Today, over a hundred years later the
district courts continue to have that exclusive jurisdiction over child custody
issues. I.C. §§ 37-715, 32-717. One slight change is that district courts now have
magistrate divisions of district courts, and the judges of such divisions are
ordinarily the initial decision makers, with there being a right of first appeal to a
district judge, who may decide to rehear the issue at a trial de novo, or to sit in an
appellate capacity. Further review of proceedings below is by appeal to this
Supreme Court which may decide the issues, or assign the case to the Court of
Appeals." - (id at 626, singled quote marks mine) -
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That, for example, at a date that is two years later after the initial proceedings, a
modification request is presented to a different District Court Judge, which now must deny
hearing that issue, and send it on back down to the Attorney Magistrate who rendered a decision
on the case originally, and whom could very well, be tied up with another case, retired, or even
passed on. Not to also mention the fact of slowing down the entire action, which the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure are not designed to do 1°.
For basic common sense says, that if a modification request , etc... is presented to District
Court Judge, even if it was not that Judge who entered the order in the first place, that District
Court Judge must correctly rule on that issue in line with the law, evidence, and facts before
them. Likewise, if such a case were presented before an Attorney Magistrate, under I.R.C.P.
Rule 82(c)(2), they would have to do the same, for simply, with either level of Judge that is their
judicial duty 11 •
As regardless of where or how the issue was raised, as long as it was raised for the Courts
review, and that Court has the proper subject matter and personal or territorial jurisdiction to
render a binding judgment. Then that Judge has the judicial duty to properly hear out the issue

IO See I.R.C.P. Rule l(a) ("[ ... ]These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.") - (Retrieved 2014, Shorting
mine) 11 See McDonald v. McDonald, 55 Idaho 102, 114, 39 P.2d 293, 298 (1934): (''The court having
jurisdiction of both the subject matter and person of the defendants, has the right and authority to
hear and determine all questions that occur in the case and are essential to a decision of the
merits of the issues, and it likewise has authority and jurisdiction to make such orders and issue
such writs as may be necessary and essential to carry the decree into effect and render it binding
and operative. [Quoting Taylor v. Huett, 15 Idaho 265,272, 97 P. 37, 39 (1908)] (emphasis
added).")- (quoted from Ratkowski v. Ratkowski, 769 P.2d 569, 115 Idaho 692 (1989) at 571) -
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before it and render judgment upon it, according to the law, evidence, and facts before them,
even if it was not the same Judge who entered the original order 11 • As to not do so, is tantamount
to a refusal to do ones Job that one was elected or appointed to do.
Therefore, as the instant action clearly has been filed in the District Court of the State of
Idaho, in front of an actual District Court Judge whom clearly has the proper subject matter and
personal or territorial jurisdiction to render a binding judgment. That Judge, even though they
are not the Judge whom entered the original order, has the responsibility and duty to follow the
law and rule according to it and the issues presented before them, notwithstanding the history of
the case or their familiarity with it. For who is to say but that same Judge given basic human
nature, that such familiarity with a case is not somehow disrupting their ability to remain
impartial and objective in the matter. Moreover, rule on the matter not according to the law,
evidence, and facts before them, but rather, their emotions and mental state towards the parties,
the accusations, and the case.
As ultimately, a Judge must, to the best that they are able, remain in perfect contact with the
touchstone of their profession, the law, and not allow their mental state or emotions to influence
any decision they may make. This however, does not mean a Judge must not be human let alone
display humanistic emotions, or have compassion, mercy, and understanding when needed, but
rather, that they, as Judges, must rule according to the law, evidence, and facts before them, even
if such comes in conflict that Judges emotions or mental state at that time. While tempering such
a ruling with that of common human emotions or mental states at that time, while still yet
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restraining such human emotions or mental states, in an effort to prevent them from running
roughshod over the law, evidence, and facts presented before them.
Ultimately, to be clear, the Plaintiff is not nor has ever denied the ability of a case to be
given to the Attorney Magistrates of the Magistrates Division of the District Court, as per
I.R.C.P. Rule 82(c)(2)'s provisions. Let alone this Court and the Idaho Appeals Court decisions
on the matter 12, but rather, hereby simply questions such a created rule's ability to do so, when it
comes into conflict with an already existing statutory law, like that of LC. § 32-715, that says
something different. For ultimately, the question posed is, does that of the existing statutory law
overrule the rule, or does the rule override that of the statutory law?
Moreover, the Plaintiff would argue that the rule cannot overrule that of a valid and existing
statutory law, as by the very nature of law, there is an order to precedence of the types of law,
and a certain way in which all types of law build upon each other, and sometimes therefore,
cancel the other types of law out. Thus, for example, rule and regulation law is trumped by case
law, case law to the extent applicable, is trumped by statute law, and statutory law to the extent
applicable, is trumped by constitutional law, and so on. In other words, it might seem insanely
simple, even Childs play and common sense to those in the legal profession, day in and day out,
but sometimes there are reasons law works the way it does. From the internal calculus of a courts
12

See generally White v. Marty, 97 Idaho 85,540 P.2d 270 (1975),overruled on other grounds
(1985), footnote# 7; Wilbanks v. State, 126 Idaho 341,344,882 P.2d 996,999 (Ct. App.1994),
at 999; STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH & WELFARE v. Conley, 971 P.2d 332, 132 Idaho 266
(Ct. App. 1999) at 335;St. Benedict's Hospital v. County of Twin Falls, 107 Idaho 143,686 P.2d
88 (Ct.App.1984) at 91 ;Carr v. Magistrate Court of the First Judicial District, 108 Idaho 546, 700
P.2d 949 (1985) at 951- 953; Busse v. Busse, 141 Idaho 566,568, 113 P.3d 224, 226 (2005) at
266, among others in both courts' histories.
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opinion, e.g. a majority having sometimes more weight than a dissent, to law and rules which are
not written down anywhere, but just are the way they are, and influence a cases direction 13 • The
simple fact is, there are central premises underlying the foundations of law, most people, even in
the legal profession, are not even cognizant of them but use their produced results every single
day, and one of those premises is that there is an order to precedence of the types of law.
Moreover, certain ways in which all types of law build upon each other, and sometimes
therefore, cancel the other type of law out.
Therefore, as the Idaho Appeals Court not only errored as to law, thereby deciding a
question of substance that is not in accord with applicable decisions of this Court, as per I.AR.
l 18(b)(2), let alone the Idaho State Constitution and Idaho Statutory law. The Plaintiff
respectfully prays that review be granted and the decision of the Idaho Appeals Court reversed,
in part, as to specifically these grounds, leaving the stipulated points on the Plaintiffs petition
for review alone.

III. The Idaho Appeals Court erred in arguing that the District
Court loses jurisdiction over child support matters, at the age of
majority, in direct contravention to this Court's precedent.
The Idaho Appeals Court relied on this Court's case of Stanger v. Stanger 14, for the
proposition that after a child obtains majority the Court loses jurisdiction over that of child

13

See generally Ratkowski v. Ratkowski, 769 P.2d 569, 115 Idaho 692 (1989) at 57l("ln Idaho,
some principles of domestic relations law are so well established that they are generally accepted
without question.")
14 Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 571 P.2d 1126 (1977) at 1130
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support for the Child. In Stanger v. Stanger supra 14, this Court relied on two other cases: Speer v.
Quinlan 15, and Piatt v. Piatt 16 for its proposition that: "The court's power to provide for maintenance of children ends once the children
reach their majority. Speer v. Quinlan, supra; Piatt v. Piatt, 32 Idaho 407, 184 P.
470 (1919). The children will attain their majority at age eighteen and the court
cannot compel support payments beyond this date. We find no error in the district
court's conclusion that child support payments could not be awarded beyond the
children's majority." - (Stanger V. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 571 P.2d 1126 (1977) at
1130)However, in Embree v. Embree 17 this Court stated that Piatt v. Piatt, supra 16, did not support
the petitioner's position, that in the matter of providing maintenance for the children, the power
of the court ends upon their attaining their majority. Furthermore, in Speer v. Quinlan 18 , the
actual language for the Court's decision cites and points right back to Piatt v. Piatt, supra
which again, in Embree v. Embree, supra 17, this Court stated that Piatt v. Piatt, supra

16,

16,

did not

provide that the power of the court ends upon their attaining their majority. However, while this
Court in Walborn v. Walborn 19 , stated: "As to the magistrate court's determination that, by analogy, the provisions of LC.
§ 7-1121 justify the award of child support until age twenty-one if the child, Jack,
was pursuing his education, the rule has always been, until the 1990 amendment to
LC. § 32-706, that a court cannot compel a spouse to support a child after the child
15

Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119,525 P.2d 314 (1974);
Piatt v. Piatt, 32 Idaho 407, 184 P. 470 (1919).
17 See Embree v. Embree, 85 Idaho 443,380 P.2d 216 (1963) in general and at 218-219.See also
In Application of Martin, 76 Idaho 179, 279 P.2d 873, 53 A.L.R.2d 582(1955); Ireland v.
Ireland, 855 P.2d 40, 123 Idaho 955 (1993) at 43 -44 citing Embree v. Embree.; Patton v. Patton,
399 P.2d 262, 88 Idaho 288 (1965) at 265 ("Jurisdiction of the court continues after judgment
for protection and welfare of such children. Stewart v. Stewart, 86 Idaho 108, 383 P.2d 617
(1963); Embree v. Embree, 85 Idaho 443, 380 P.2d 216 (1963); Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349,
180 P.2d 853 (1947); I.C. § 32-705.")
18 Speer v. Quinlan, supra15 , at 327
19 Walborn v. Walborn, 817 P.2d 160, 120 Idaho 494 (1991) at 165-166
16
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has attained its majority. Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725,571 P.2d 1126 (1977);
Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119,525 P.2d 314 (1974); Embree v. Embree, 85 Idaho
443, 380 P.2d 216 (1963); Piatt v. Piatt, 32 Idaho 407, 184 P. 470 (1919). The trial
court's expansion by analogy of the provisions of LC. § 7-1121 conflicts with the
pre-1990 version of 32-706 and our prior cases, and therefore we reject it. Jack, the
minor child, became eighteen years of age in June of 1990. The 1990 amendment
to LC. § 32-706, which specifically provides that child support obligations may
continue only until a child is eighteen years of age or, if the child continues his
education, until he reaches age nineteen, did not become effective until July 1,
1990. Therefore, we conclude that the 1990 amendment, which did not take effect
until after Jack became an adult, was not applicable to Jack in this case, and does
not support the trial court's order requiring child support beyond age eighteen."
Upon which this Court, therein Walborn v. Walborn supra 19, based the precept that a court
could not compel support for a child after the child has attained its majority, as the court had lost
its jurisdiction over the child at that point. On the following cases of Stanger v. Stanger supra 14 ,
Speer v. Quinlan supra 15 and

18

,

Embree v. Embree supra

17

,

and Piatt v. Piatt supra 16 • However,

this is not what then language in Embree v. Embree supra17 actually states. Let alone, the fact
that every case that this Court therein cited in Walborn v. Walborn, supra 19 , in the above quote.
Ultimately, points right back to this Court's case of Piatt v. Piatt supra 16, for the precept that a
court cannot compel support of a child after the child has attained its majority, due to the court
losing jurisdiction due to the chronological age of the child. However, in Embree v. Embree
supra 17, this Court declared that Piatt v. Piatt supra 16, did not stand for the petitioner's position,
that in the matter of providing maintenance for the children, the power of the court ends upon
their attaining their majority. Furthermore, it has been twenty-four years since J.C.§ 32-706
1990's amendment, that allows the court to order child support to continue post-majority, thus,
any argument to contrary, that the power of the court ends upon child attaining their majority, is
illogical and moot, as clearly, the 1990 amendment to LC. § 32-706 changed that forever.
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Therefore, as the Idaho Appeals Court not only errored by using such law, as it decided a
question of substance that is not in accord with applicable decisions of the this Court, as per

I.AR. l 18(b)(2), let alone LC.§ 32.:706. In addition, given that the Idaho Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a previous decision 20 of the Idaho Court of Appeals, as per

I.AR. l 18(b)(3). The Plaintiff respectfully prays that review be granted and the decision of the
Idaho Appeals Court reversed, in part, as to specifically these grounds, leaving the stipulated
points on the Plaintiff's petition for review alone.

IV. The District court below and Idaho Appeals Court erred as to
law and common sense, given that such contract is implied-in-fact
and strictly oral, i.e. word of mouth, in nature.
The United States Supreme Court in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
592, 43 S. Ct. 425, 67 L. Ed. 816 (1923).at 597, has defined an implied-in-fact contract as being:
"an agreement 'implied in fact', founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied
in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of
the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding." The United States Supreme Court in
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States went on to state at 597-599:
"The [']implied agreement['] contemplated by the Dent Act as the basis of
compensation, is not an agreement [']implied in law,['] more aptly termed a
constructive or quasi contract, where, by fiction of law, a promise is imputed to
perform a legal duty, as to repay money obtained by fraud or duress, but an
agreement [']implied in fact,['] founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although
not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the
parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit
understanding. See, by analogy, as to the construction of similar jurisdictional
20

See also the Idaho Court of Appeals case Howard v. Mecham, 117 Idaho 542, 789 P.2d
538.(Ct.App.1990) citing Embree v. Embree, supra 17 , at 539.
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statutes, United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 566; Russell
v. United States, 182 U.S. 516,530; Harley v. United States, 198 U.S. 229, 234;
United States v. Anciens Establishments, 224 U.S. 309, 311, 320; United States v.
Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U.S. 228,232; Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 129;
and Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 581; and, generally, Railway Co. v.
Gaffney, 65 Ohio St. 104, 113; Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345,350; Hertzog v.
Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465,468; Knapp v. United States, 46 Ct. Clms. 601, 643; and 1
Bouv. Diet. (Rawle's 3d Rev.) 660. That this provision of the Dent Act relates only
to such actual agreements, implied in fact from the circumstances, is not only
indicated by its purpose, as expressed in the caption, of providing relief in cases of
[']contracts['] connected with the prosecution of the war, but is conclusively
shown by the fact that the "agreement" is described as one "entered into, in good
faith," by the claimant, with an officer or agent of the Government, upon the faith
of which expenditures have been made or obligations incurred, and which has not
been executed as prescribed by law; this language aptly describing an actual
agreement implied in fact, but being manifestly inapplicable to a constructive
agreement implied in law.
Such an agreement will not be implied unless the meeting of minds was indicated
by some intelligible conduct, act or sign. Woods v. Ayres, supra, p. 351; and cases
there cited. And so an agreement to pay for services rendered by the plaintiff will
not be implied when they were rendered spontaneously, without request, as an act
of kindness (Woods v. Ayres, supra, p. 351); when the plaintiff did not expect
payment, or under the circumstances did not have reason to entertain such
expectation (Coleman v. United States, 152 U.S. 96, 99; Lafontain v. Hayhurst, 89
Maine, 388, 391); when the defendant understood that the plaintiff would neither
expect nor demand remuneration (Harley v. United States, supra, p. 235); when
unusual expenses were incurred, without special request or previous notice, and
without any intimation or suggestion that compensation would be looked for or
made (Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, ante, 385); when the defendant
neither requested the services nor assented to receiving their benefit under
circumstances negativing any presumption that they would be gratuitous (Railway
Co. v. Gaffney, supra, p. 116; 2 Abb. Tr. Ev., 3d ed., 912, and cases there
cited);[Footnote # 1[ But an agreement to compensate the plaintiff for the use of
his property will be implied when it was used by the defendant without claim of
right, and the plaintiff consented to such use with the expectation of receiving
compensation. United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 269; United States v. Berdan
Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 567; United States v. Anciens Establishments,
supra, p. 320. And see, as to the implied agreement to pay for property
appropriated by legislative authority for a public use, without condemnation
proceedings, United States v. North American Transportation & Trading Co., 253
U.S. 330, and cases there cited.] and when the circumstances account for the
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transaction on a ground more probable than that of a promise of recompense
(Woods v. Ayres, supra, p. 351.)(Footnote # 2[As to the character of evidence by
which an implied agreement to pay for services is generally established, see 2 Abb.
Tr. Ev. 913, and cases there cited.]" - (The United States Supreme Court in
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 43 S. Ct. 425, 67 L. Ed.
816 (1923) at 597-599, footnote inclusion and singled quotation marks mine)This Court is also in accord, for in Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 52 P.3d 848, 137 Idaho
703 (2002) at 852-853, this Court stated:
"This Court has recognized three types of contractual relationships:
First is the express contract wherein the parties expressly agree
regarding a transaction. Secondly, there is the implied in fact contract
wherein there is no express agreement but the conduct of the parties
implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists. The
third category is called an implied in law contract, or quasi contract.
However, a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and
equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and,
in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties. It is a noncontractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a
contract, and is often refered (sic) to as quasi contract, unjust enrichment,
implied in law contract or restitution.
Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739,743,518
P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974) (citations omitted).
[']An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of
the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one
party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances
attending the performance.['] Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d
1378, 1382 (1994) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810,
815 (1965)). The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and
tacit understanding. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029
(1997). [']The general rule is that where the conduct of the parties allows the dual
inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting party
promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied in fact.['] Homes by
Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 989, 991 (1986) (citing
Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965); Bastian v.
Gafford, 98 Idaho 324,325,563 P.2d 48, 49 (1977))."-(Fox v. Mountain West
Elec., Inc., 52 P.3d 848, 137 Idaho 703 (2002) at 852-853, singled quotation marks
mine) -
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Further, this Court in Farnworth v. Femling, 869 P.2d 1378, 125 Idaho 283 (1994) at 1382,
stated:
"An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party
and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances
attending the performance. Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153, 408 P.2d 810,
815 (1965)." - (Farnworth v. Femling, 869 P.2d 1378, 125 Idaho 283 (1994) at
1382)Additionally, this Court in CLAYSON v. ZEBE, No. 38471 (Idaho July 2, 2012) stated the
following regarding implied-in-fact contracts: "An implied-in-fact contract exists where [']there is no express agreement[,] but
the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in
contract exists.['] Fox, 137 Idaho at 707, 52 P.3d at 852 (quoting Cont'l Forest
Prods., Inc. v. Chandler Supp. Co., 95 Idaho 739,743,518 P.2d 1201, 1205
(1974)). We have held that ['][a]n implied in fact contract is defined as one where
the terms and existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties
with the request of one party and the performance by the other often being inferred
from the circumstances attending the performance.['] Id. at 708, 52 P.3d at 853
(citing Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994)).
Therefore, we have stated the general rule as follows: [']where the conduct of the
parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that
the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied
in fact.['] Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Servs., Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387, 210 P.3d 63,
72 (2009) (quoting Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319,321, 715 P.2d
989, 991 (1986))." - (Singled quotation marks mine) Thus, a simple example of an implied-in-fact contract, would be when a patient goes to a
doctor's appointment, the patient's actions indicate they intend to receive treatment in exchange
for paying reasonable/fair doctor's fees. Likewise, by seeing the patient, the doctor's actions
indicate he intends to treat the patient in exchange for payment of the bill. Therefore, a contract
actually existed between the doctor and the patient, even though nobody spoke any words of
agreement, as they both agreed to the same essential terms, and acted in accordance with that
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agreement, thus, there was mutuality of consideration. In most cases, most Courts will probably
find that as a matter of fact that the parties had an implied contract, and that, if the patient refuses
to pay after being examined, he will have breached the implied contract21 .
Furthermore, Blacks Law Dictionary 9 th ed.(2009, WestLaw), defines an implied-factcontract as "A contract that the parties presumably intended as their tacit understanding is
inferred from their conduct and other circumstances." Moreover, Blacks Law Dictionary 9 th ed.
(2009, WestLaw), also defines a oral contract as a parol contract22 , which it in turn, defines as,
"A contract or modification of a contract that is not in writing or is only partially in writing."
With the above terminology defined, a secondary inside question must be raised, given that
there are multiple contracts with the instant action23 , that are all at play, which contract was the
District Court and the Idaho Appeals Court referring to? From all appearances it would seem,
that both Courts were attempting to addresses the Implied-in-fact Oral Contract for a Vehicle,
thus, the Plaintiff will first address that Contract, and then detail the other contracts. So as to give
everyone a better understanding of the instant action which has seemingly gone unnoticed by
nearly everyone, due to some erroneously based assumptions made primarily by the Defense
counsel, and the lower Courts, in the early stages of the case.

21

In fact as the United States Supreme Court in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) mentioned
in passing at 34l("A great mass of human transactions depends upon implied contracts; upon
contracts which are not written, but which grow out of the acts of the parties")
22 Blacks Law Dictionary 9th ed.(2009, WestLaw), Term: "Oral Contract", Pg. 1205, Defined as:
"See parol contract (1) under CONTRACT", which in turn, defines "parol contract (1) under
CONTRACT", on Pg. 371, as "A contract or modification of a contract that is not in writing or
is only partially in writing."
23 See (R. Vol. 4. Pg. 674, Ln. 6 -11)
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First, the Oral Contract for a Vehicle, was as the Plaintiff already stated below, an openended indefinite implied-in-fact oral contract24 . The point that the Plaintiff hereby posits is this,
in requiring evidence of an implied-in-fact oral contract beyond the evidence provided in the
record, by affidavits attesting to its general existence25 , the District court below and Idaho
Appeals Court erred as to law and common sense, by requiring additional evidence beyond what
was already provided to the Courts. Given, that logically speaking, such contract is an impliedin-fact and strictly oral, or word of mouth, in nature, and thus, is a contract wherein there is no
express agreement, but rather, the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an
obligation in contract exists. For simply, as this Court has held, as was noted in CLAYSON v.
ZEBE, No. 38471 (Idaho July 2, 2012), that:
"An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party
and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances
attending the performance. Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143,153,408 P.2d 810,
815 (1965)." -(quoting Farnworth v. Femling, 869 P.2d 1378, 125 Idaho 283
(1994) at 1382)Thus, to put it rather bluntly, what other evidence beyond what was already provided to the
Courts, does the Courts expect, to prove an open-ended indefinite implied-in-fact oral contract,
actually exists or existed? For while truly stating the obvious, the Court looks at the conduct or
behavior of the parties, to see if such conduct or behavior suggests such a contract or

24

See (R. Vol. 4. Pg. 678, Ln. 36 -39); (R. Vol. 4. Pg. 679, Ln. 11 -14); (R. Vol. 4. Pg. 679, Ln.
16-30);(R. Vol. 4. Pg. 680, Ln. 7) among other locations in the record.
25 See (R. Vol. 5. Plaintiffs Ex. Fl-12 # 3), (R. Vol. 1. Pg. 7, Ln. 3-20), (R. Vol. 2. Pg. 168, Ln.
3-20).
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understanding existed, and if it does, then such a contract existed. For simply, as this Court has
again pointed out CLAYSON v. ZEBE, No. 38471 (Idaho July 2, 2012): "Therefore, we have stated the general rule as follows: [']where the conduct of the
parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that
the requesting party promised payment[. T]hen the court may find a contract
implied in fact.['] Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Servs., Inc., 147 Idaho 378,387,210
P.3d 63, 72 (2009) (quoting Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321,
715 P.2d 989, 991 (1986))." -(grammar and spelling change for readability mine) Thus, to essentially demand evidence beyond what was already in the record, attesting to
such a contract's existence and the conduct of the parties25 , is in violation law to the extent that
such a demand requests more evidence. Then what is normally required by the rule of this Court,
let alone the United States Supreme Court, when dealing with a contract that is open-ended
indefinite implied-in-fact oral type of contract, not also mention, it violates good old fashion
common sense.
Second, on to identifying the other Contracts within the instant action, as far as the Plaintiff
has been able to legally ascertain, there exists four separate points/situations, recognizable as
contracts in the instant action 26 •
1.

An open-ended indefinite implied-in-fact oral contract for the Vehicle, as noted
above26 •

2. An implied-in-law, or quasi-contract, contract resembled by the Divorce decree 26 •

26 As to Contracts, for# 1 see (R. Vol. 5. Plaintiffs Ex. Fl-12 # 3), (R. Vol. 1. Pg. 7, Ln. 3-20),
(R. Vol. 2. Pg. 168, Ln. 3-20). For# 2 (R. Vol. 5. Plaintiffs Ex. A). For# 3 (R. Vol. 5.
Plaintiffs Ex. Fl-12 # 4). For# 4 (R. Vol. 4, Pg. 713, Ln. 3 -19), among other sources in the
record.
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3.

An open-ended indefinite implied-in-fact oral contract for educational support,
post majority26 •

4. An open-ended indefinite implied-in-fact oral contract for child support, post
majority 26 •
It is those last two contracts that seem to be causing all the heartache for the Defense's legal
counsel and the Courts, as the Defense's legal counsel has made the erroneous assumption early
on in the case. The Divorce decree 27 , which embodies an implied-in-law, or quasi-contract,
contract, contained the only actionable contract as it were, and therefore it stopped any postmajority support. However, what the Defense legal counsel forgets in its assumption, which in
turn led to a mislead court among other things, is that their premise that the Divorce Decree27
was the end all to end all on the issue, is false. Due the Defenses legal counsel's assumption that
the Divorce Decree27 stopped or removed any capacity or power of the parents, let alone that of
the Plaintiff, to go beyond requirements in the statute, and make a private open-ended indefinite
implied-in-fact oral contract for pre and post majority education. As well as for post-majority
child support, at exactly the same time as going through the divorce, by exercising their freedom
of contract28, together and separately, as a family.

27

See (R. Vol. 5. Plaintiffs Ex. A)
See Idaho Power Company v. NEW ENERGY TWO, LLC., No. 40882-2013 (Idaho June 17,
2014); Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene Univ., 152 Idaho 660, 666-67, 273 P.3d 1253, 1259-60
(2012) at 1254; Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552 (2009) at 560; Jesse v.
Lindsley, 233 P.3d I, 149 Idaho 70 (2008) at 6-7; Klassert v. Wadley, 788 P.2d 239, 117 Idaho
424 (Ct. App. 1990) at 241, among others. )---(continued on next page in foots)------------------------------- -(Continued from previous page's footnote #28) -(All citing this Courts case of
Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107, 110 (1970) at 110 for
28
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In other words, the Defenses' legal counsels general assumption was in error, as the Divorce
Decree27 never ended anyone in the family's private ability to otherwise engage in their protected
freedom of contract28 • In fact, all the Divorce Decree27 did was establish an implied-in-law, or
quasi-contract, as was required by the laws of the State of Idaho. However, it did not end anyone
in the family's private ability or freedom 28 to go beyond such an implied-in-law, or quasicontract, represented by the Divorce Decree27 or the laws of the State of Idaho, and engages in
their protected freedom of contract28

•

To provide for things that the Divorce Decree27 or State

Law did not otherwise provide for, by using their protected freedom of contract28 , to make two
completely oral private open-ended indefinite implied-in-fact oral contracts, one, for pre and post
majority educational support, as well as one for post-majority child support, all at exact same
time as going through the divorce. Such issues often invoke that of this Court's doctrine of
the proposition, that ("Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of
contracts and is an essential element of the free enterprise system.") See also Irvine v. Perry, 299
P.2d 97, 78 Idaho 132 (1956)(Chief Justice TAYLOR, dissent) at 105,("So fundamental is this
right of freedom of contract, that it was made the object of protection by both the federal, Art. 1,
§ 10, and state, Art. 1, § 16, constitutions. Not even the legislature could thus violate this
contract and impose a liability which the parties contracted against."). In fact as the United
States Supreme Court in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) mentioned in passing at 346347(" ... individuals do not derive from government their right to contract, but bring that right
with them into society; that obligation is not conferred on contracts by positive law, but is
intrinsic, and is conferred by the act of the parties. This results from the right which every man
retains to acquire property, to dispose of that property according to his own judgment, and to
pledge him self for a future act. These rights are not given by society but are brought into it. The
right of coercion is necessarily surrendered to government, .and this surrender imposes on
government the correlative duty of furnishing a remedy. The right to regulate contracts, to
prescribe rules by which they shall be evidenced, to prohibit such as may be deemed
mischievous, is unquestionable, and has been universally exercised. So far as this power has
restrained the original right of individuals to")--- (Continued on next page in footnotes bind
themselves by contract, it is restrained; but beyond these actual restraints the original power
remains unimpaired.")
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merger and incorporation29 , and while true, such a freedom of contract28 is restricted, as the
Idaho Court of Appeals noted in Klassert v. Wadley, 788 P.2d 239, 117 Idaho 424 (Ct. App.
1990) at 241, that in pertinent part :
. "[ .... ] Second, although some statutory benefits and protections can be waived by
contract, see, e.g., Chittenden & Eastman Co. v. Leasure, 116 Idaho 981, 783 P.2d
320 (Ct.App. 1989) (contract relating to attorney fees), the stipulation here was not
a conventional contract. Rather, it was a special kind of contract involving third
parties, the children, who were beneficiaries of the support provisions of the
divorce decree. Recognizing the separate interests of children - and the
judiciary's duty to protect those interests - courts in other states have held that a
statutory requirement of court approval cannot be waived by contract. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Evans, 17 Ariz. App. 323,497 P.2d 830 (1972); Napoleon v. Napoleon,
59 Haw. 619, 585 P.2d 1270 (1978).
Idaho case law is in general accord with this position. For example, the parties to a
divorce cannot by contract di vest the court of its continuing jurisdiction in matters
concerning minor children. McFarland v. Crawford, 97 Idaho 458,459,546 P.2d
855, 856 (1976). Neither can the parties bargain away the children's rights under
child custody statutes, Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288, 399 P.2d 262 (1965), or the
children's entitlement to [']suitable provision for [their] support.['] Keyes v.
Keyes, 51 Idaho 670,674, 9 P.2d 804,805 (1932). We see no reason to tum away
from this clear trend in recognizing children's interests. While we acknowledge the
principle of freedom of contract between adults, this principle must yield when
statutorily protected interests of children are at stake." -(Idaho Court of Appeals in
Klassert v. Wadley, 788 P.2d 239, 117 Idaho 424 (Ct. App. 1990) at 241, single
quotation marks and omission for shortening, mine)However, there is nothing, as far as the Plaintiff could find in a cursory search of law, which
prohibits going beyond statutory law requirements, to provide for ones' child. Such as the
parents did in the 2006 divorce action by engaging in their protected freedom of contract28 , with
the Plaintiff as an integral and interested party and beneficiary thereto, when the State of Idaho's
statutory law requirements did not provide for the upbringing and support of the Plaintiff, that
29

See generally this Court's case of Phillips v. Phillips, 462 P.2d 49, 93 Idaho 384, 93 Id. 384
(1969); Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885,894 P.2d 118 (1995); Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 766 P.2d
1219, 115 Idaho 338 (1988), among many others.
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the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiffs parents, wanted for the Plaintiff. For ultimately, the parents of
the Plaintiff wanted the Plaintiff to be supported and provided for 30 , however, they just did not
want the State to be a part of it, nor telling them how to provide for nor raise their offspring. As
it was a private family matter, and now, ultimately and unfortunately, it will have to be an issue
that still must be dealt with here, or in the Courts below.
Thus, as the Idaho Appeals Court and the District Court below, errored by using such law,
as it decided a question of substance that is not in accord with applicable decisions of this Court,
nor the United States Supreme Court, as per I.AR. 118(b)(2). The Plaintiff respectfully prays
that review be granted and the decision of the Idaho Appeals Court reversed, in part, as to
specifically these grounds, leaving the stipulated points on the Plaintiffs petition for review
alone.

V. The Idaho Appeals Court, as well as the District Court below,
errored as to the Idaho Rules of Evidence , as well as the United
States Constitution, by disallowing evidence offered by a pro-se
party on said party's own history, events, and family history.
The United States Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97
L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) at 51, stated: "The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several
provisions of the Constitution. It is one of the rights that [']are essential to due
process of law in a fair adversary process.['] Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819, n. 15 (1975). The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law
include a right to be heard and to offer testimony: [']A person's right to reasonable
notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense - a
right to his day in court - are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these
30

See (R. Vol. 4, Pg. 713, Ln. 3 -19)
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rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.['] (Emphasis added.) In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257,273 (1948).[Note # 8]Before Ferguson v. Georgia, it might have
been argued that a defendant's ability to present an unswom statement would
satisfy this right. Once that procedure was eliminated, however, there was no
longer any doubt that the right to be heard, which is so essential to due process in
an adversary system of adjudication, could be vindicated only by affording a
defendant an opportunity to testify before the factfinder.J See also Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S., at 602 (Clark, J., concurring) (Fourteenth Amendment secures
[']right of a criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying in his own
behalf['])[[Note # 9] This right reaches beyond the criminal trial: the procedural
due process constitutionally required in some extrajudicial proceedings includes
the right of the affected person to testify. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
489 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)
(termination of welfare benefits).]) - (Singled quote marks, and footnote inclusion
mine)Thus, it is clear, the right to testify on one's own behalf applies to both civil and criminal
cases, and is essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process. In fact, the necessary
ingredients of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, guarantee that no one
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law, and include a right to be heard and to
offer testimony. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948) at 273, held that a person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, an
opportunity to be heard in his defense, and a right to his day in court, are basic in our system of
jurisprudence. Moreover, these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses
against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel3 1•
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See the United States Supreme Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) at 273,
footnote # 31 ("The following decisions of this Court involving various kinds of proceedings are
among the multitude that support the above statement: Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
116; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-70; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409,418; Holden v.
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Thus, for any court, let alone the District Court and the Idaho Appeals court, to disallow or
treat such testimony offered on the Pro-se petitioners own behalf as mere unsupported and
inconsequential statements 32 , is an outright violation of the Pro-se petitioners own constitutional
rights, as above shown. For true, such a Pro-se petitioner is not entitled to perjure themselves 33
while making such statements on their own behalf, however, they are still allowed to testify on
their own behalf, for that is their constitutionally protected right. Such is often an issue with Prose petitioners, as they are wearing both the hat of the attorney and the hat of the client, at the
exact same time, and must, to the extent that they are able, do both jobs equally well.
However, this in turn, often raises an interesting common sense issue for Pro-se petitioners,
as on the one hand they must act as the attorney who in turn defends and protects their rights, and
acts upon the case. On the other hand, there is the client whose rights and case need protected, as
well as defended, and acted upon. Such a situation can often put a pro-se petitioner at further
risk then the risk assumed by being ones' own legal counsel. For example, a pro-se petitioner
acting as the attorney in their own case often finds themselves caught between a rock and a hard
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390-391; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15, and cases there
cited.")
32 See Idaho Appeals Court Unpublished Opinion No. 625, Pg. 7, Ln. 22-24, in the instant action.
33 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971) at 225226.("Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.
But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. See United States
v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); cf. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). Having
voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an")- (Continued on next page in footnotes)----(Continued from previous page's footnote# 33 ) - ("obligation to speak truthfully and
accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices
of the adversary process. Had inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third
person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of
cross-examination and impeachment.")
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place, when something that would violate their constitutionally protected right against selfincrimination, needs to be stated to the court but cannot be, because to utter it, would otherwise
incriminate them. However, in Faretta v. Califomia34, the United States Supreme Court raised a
potential solution to such a problem, which the Plaintiff hereby whole heartedly requests this
Court consider implementing in some way, beyond the Idaho Legal Aid now available, for Prose petitioner's in the State of Idaho: "We are told that many criminal defendants representing themselves may use the
courtroom for deliberate disruption of their trials. But the right of selfrepresentation has been recognized from our beginnings by federal law and by
most of the States, and no such result has thereby occurred. Moreover, the trial
judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages
in serious and obstructionist misconduct. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337. Of
course, a State may-even over objection by the accused-appoint a
[']standby counsel['] to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help,
and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of
the defendant's self-representation is necessary. See United States v.
Dougherty, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 762 87-89, 473 F. 2d 1113, 1124-1126." (holding, underlining, and single quotation marks mine) -Such a "standby counsel" that should be appointed to aid the pro-se petitioner if and when
the pro-se petitioner requests help, and to be available to represent the pro-se petitioner in the
event that termination of the pro-se petitioner self-representation is necessary, by the order of the
Court or by request of the pro-se petitioner. This action would help to alleviate such issues, as
such standby counsel could interrupt the Court proceedings, on behalf of pro-se petitioner, to
confer with the pro-se petitioner to counsel and guide them while still letting the pro-se petitioner
be in control. As well as, to a certain extent, provide protection of the pro-se petitioner's

See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) at footnote#
46
34
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constitutional rights or take over the case, if only temporally, or upon court order, perrnentally,
to, with the pro-se petitioner's input, argue the case before the court if the pro-se petitioner
becomes unable to, or by their behavior or actions in the Court. The pro-se petitioner must have
their right of self-representation terminated, but only for good legitimate and legally grounded
cause, by order of the court. Additionally, and of small mention, this Court has repeatedly said,
"Prose litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." 35
However, this is in conflict with Faretta v. California36 , where the United States Supreme Court
stated, in pertainet part: "It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend
with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the
defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential
advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only
imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the
law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some rare
instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more effectively by
conducting his own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of
averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the
State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant,
therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case
counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of [']that respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.['] Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350-351 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual
matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For
this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must [']knowingly and
intelligently['] forgo those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S., at
464-465. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (plurality opinion of
Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of
35

See Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442,445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003) among
others in this Court's history.
36 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) at 834 -835
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a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he
should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that ['Jhe knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open.['] Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S., at
279." - (single quotation marks mine) Which, somewhat implies that pro-se petitioner's, "need not[ ... ] have the skill and
experience of an attorney in order" to handle a case. It is additionally in conflict with Haines v.
Kerner 37 , in which the United States Supreme Court stated as part of its holding: "We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the prose complaint,
which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by s[ ... ]" (shortening for length mine)That of a pro-se petitioner's pleadings are to be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by attorneys. Therefore, by this Court ultimately stating that "Pro se litigants
are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney35 ," this Court is
being untruthful. Moreover, this Court is deliberately imposing an undue burden upon pro-se
petitioners, to have the skills and experience of an attorney, as well as requiring pro-se
petitioners' pleadings to be held to the same standards as those drafted by an attorney. Instead,
by holding both an attorney and a pro-se petitioner alike, to the rules of the Court, and enforcing
each party with equal measure upon both attorney or pro-se petitioner, when needed. This is
exactly what this Court did in the original case of Scafco v. Rigby & Mason38 , although not in
holding but in dicta at 383, with the language of: "The motion was in violation of I.R.C.P. 59(a) in that it failed to allege any
grounds with sufficient particularity. Such a violation is not to be excused simply

because defendants were appearing pro se and may not have been aware of
the rule." - (balding and underlining mine) 37
38

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) at 512
See Scafco v. Rigby & Mason, 98 Idaho 432,566 P.2d 381 (No. 12251, June 27, 1977) at 383
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Which this Court then in turn, started citing for the principle and holding, that, "a litigant
appearing prose is held to the same standards and rules as one appearing with counsel," even
though it was not a true holding, but dicta instead. Moreover, was not what was even truly stated
in Scafco v. Rigby & Mason at 383 38 , but a poor and shameful improvised substitute, which, for
unknown reasons, perhaps political or otherwise, this Court chose to fire right at pro-se
petitioners in violation of everything, this Court as a court of law is supposed to stand for and
hold dear to 39 •
Thus, when a Pro-se petitioner approaches the Court and the legal system, they are often at a
disadvantage, as they are wearing both the hat of the attorney, and the hat of the client, at the
exact same time, and must, to the extent that they are able, do both jobs equally well. Which in
turn, creates a multitude of issues, however, for any court, let alone the District Court and the
Idaho Appeals court, to disallow or treat such testimony offered on the Pro-se petitioners own
behalf as mere unsupported and inconsequential statements 32, is an outright violation of the Prose petitioners own constitutional rights, as above shown. For true, such a Pro-se petitioner is not
entitled to perjure themselves while making such statements on their own behalf33, however,
they are still allowed to testify on their own behalf for that is their constitutionally protected
right. This, therefore, requires any Court to treat any spoken, within that of the limit of perjury,
words by a Pro-se petitioner, as testimony offered on the Pro-se petitioners own behalf. For

39

See Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 739 P.2d 385 (1987)(Justice Bistline,
Dissent) at 389, alluding to this Courts actions and feelings towards pro-se petitioners. (''The
majority, in its usual haste to affirm against a prose party, [']has failed['] to recognize that Mrs.
Bell was not the plaintiff and did not have the burden of location and description.".
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simple common sense holds, that as a Pro-se petitioner is both a attorney and client at the exact
same time, there is no reason to differentiate between statements made as a Pro-se petitioner or a
Pro-se petitioner as their own attorney, for both are protected, and both, are always testimony
offered on the Pro-se petitioners own behalf. For whether or not a Pro-se petitioner is acting as a
client or an attorney common sense holds, ultimately, that they both speak with the same
person's mouth.
Thus, for any court, let alone the District Court and the Idaho Appeals court, to disallow or
treat such testimony offered on the Pro-se petitioners own behalf, as mere unsupported and
inconsequential statements, is an outright violation of the Pro-se petitioners own constitutional
rights to testify on their own behalf. Additionally, such actions by the District Court and the
Idaho Appeals court, are also in violation of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, which ultimately,
allow for and provide exceptions for testimony offered on the Pro-se petitioners own behalt4° .
Therefore, as the Idaho Appeals Court not only errored by such actions, deciding a question
of substance that is not in accord with applicable decisions of this Court, as per I.AR. l 18(b)(2),
or the United States Supreme Court, let alone the United States Constitution and the Idaho Rules
of Evidence. The Plaintiff respectfully prays that review be granted and the decision of the
Idaho Appeals Court reversed, in part, as to specifically these grounds, leaving the stipulated
points on the Plaintiffs petition for review alone.

40

See generally I.R.E. 701; I.RE. 601;1.R.E. 602; I.R.E. 704; 1.R.E. 801(19-21) I.R.E. 804(b)(4),
as well as generally, the United States Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107
S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) at 51-53; and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26, 91
S.Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).
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VI. The Idaho Appeals Court errored by disallowing oral argument,
which is not only an outright right protected by the United States
Constitution, but is also an act which is in direct contravention to
U.S. Supreme Court binding precedent.
The United States Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97
L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) at 51 stated: "The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several
provisions of the Constitution. It is one of the rights that [']are essential to due
process of law in a fair adversary process.['] Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806,
819, n. 15 (1975). The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law
include a right to be heard and to offer testimony: [']A person's right to reasonable
notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense - a
right to his day in court - are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these
rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.['] (Emphasis added.) In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).[Note # 8]Before Ferguson v. Georgia, it might have
been argued that a defendant's ability to present an unsworn statement would
satisfy this right. Once that procedure was eliminated, however, there was no
longer any doubt that the right to be heard, which is so essential to due process in
an adversary system of adjudication, could be vindicated only by affording a
defendant an opportunity to testify before the factfinder.] See also Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S., at 602 (Clark, J., concurring) (Fourteenth Amendment secures
[']right of a criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying in his own
behalf[' ])[[Note # 9 ] This right reaches beyond the criminal trial: the procedural
due process constitutionally required in some extrajudicial proceedings includes
the right of the affected person to testify. See, e. g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471,
489 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)
(termination of welfare benefits).]) - (Singled quote marks, and footnote inclusion
mine)Thus, it is clear, the right to testify on one's own behalf applies to both civil and criminal
cases, and is essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process. In fact, the necessary
ingredients of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, guarantee that no one
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shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law, and include a right to be heard and to
offer testimony. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948) at 273, held that a person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, an
opportunity to be heard in his defense, and a right to his day in court, are basic in our system of
jurisprudence. Moreover, these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses
against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel41 •
Therefore, as the Idaho Appeals Court not only errored by refusing to hear oral argument42 ,
thereby deciding a question of substance that is not in accord with applicable decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, as per I.A.R. 118(b)(2), let alone the United States Constitution.
The Plaintiff respectfully prays that review be granted and the decision of the Idaho Appeals
Court reversed, in part, as to specifically these grounds, leaving the stipulated points alone.

Prayer for Relief
Wherefore, the Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court grant this petition and reverse and
remand the Idaho Court of Appeals decision of July 17 th 2014, in part, as stipulated thereto in the
petition for review by the Plaintiff, as being in violation of law and/or fact, and good old
common sense. Additionally, Plaintiff also requests attorney's fees and/or costs pursuant to LC.

41

See the United States Supreme Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) at 273, at
footnote# 3 l("The following decisions of this Court involving various kinds of proceedings are
among the multitude that support the above statement: Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
116; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-70; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409,418; Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390-391; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15, and cases there
cited.")
42 See orders of the Idaho Court of Appeal Order Submitting Appeal For Decision On The Briefs
And Without Oral Argument on 05/12/2014 on Denial of Objection to the same on 06/12/2014.
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§ 12-117 and any other applicable fee and/or co.st provisions and law, as well as any argument on

the .same from the original Plaintiff's initial brief. redone initial brief. and reply brief.
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